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A "Frozen Exception" for the Frozen
Embryo: The Davis "Reasonable
Alternatives Exception"
JENNIFER L. MEDENWALD*
INTRODUCTION
In the sixth month, the angel Gabriel was sent from God to a town of Galilee
called Nazareth, to a virgin betrothed to a man named Joseph... and the virgin's
name was Mar..... Then the angel said to her, ".. . Behold, you will conceive
in your womb and bear a son... ." But Mary said to the angel, "How can this be,
since I have no relations with a man?" And the angel said to her in reply, "The
Holy Spirit will come upon you and the power of the Most High will overshadowyou.'
Unable to rely on divine intervention in order to conceive a child, many infertile
couples2 today seek help from technological advances such as in vitro fertilization
("IVF") and cryopreservation of embryos, also known as "frozen embryos,"3 in order
to become parents.4 Studies estimate that fifteen percent of all reproductively active
couples experience some difficulty conceiving children.5 Furthermore, research
indicates that ten million out of sixty-seven million reproductively active couples are
infertile.6 Just as technological advances have been made in order to accommodate
reproductively active couples who experience difficulty conceiving children, so too
has the legal system had to advance in order to deal with the legal issues
accompanying these alternatives to natural conception.7 Two of the most noteworthy
strides made by the legal system to address the legal issues accompanying IVF and
cryopreservation include the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Davis v. Davis,8 and the
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1. Luke 1:26-:27, :30-:31, :34-:35.
2. Couples are "infertile" if they do not conceive a child after one year of unprotected
intercourse. I ROBERT K. AUSMAN & DEAN E. SNYDER, MEDICAL LIBRARY § 1.32, at 175
(Lawyers ed. 1988).
3. Jennifer M. Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights
Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions ofFrozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1377 n.4
(1995) ('The term 'frozen embryos' ... is the term of art denoting cryogenically-preserved
preembryos.').
4. See id. at 1380.
5. Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise
SoundRule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DEPAUL L.
REv. 523, 526 (1994).
6. Id. (citing Tamara L. Davis, Comment, Protecting the Cryopreserved Embryo, 57
TENN. L. REv. 507, 510 n.22 (1990)).
7. See Dehmel, supra note 3, at 1377-78.
8. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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New York Court of Appeals case, Kass v. Kass.9
Davis started as a divorce action" and eventually culminated in a battle for custody
over seven frozen embryos that were being stored at a Knoxville, Tennessee fertility
clinic." The trial court awarded custody of the frozen embryos to Mary Sue Davis,
the mother. 2 The court of appeals reversed and held that Mary Sue Davis and Junior
Davis, the father, should have "joint control of the fertilized ova and [an] equal voice
over their disposition."'3 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that
because there was no agreement regarding the disposition of the frozen embryos,
under this grant of "joint control" they would continue to be stored and eventually
would no longer be viable for implantation, resulting in a victory by way of a veto
power for Junior Davis. 4 In an effort to erase any victory by way of such a veto
power, 5 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that "the right ofprocreational autonomy
is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right
to avoid procreation."' 6 Balancing these rights, the court held:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that
the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives
exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy
should be considered.'
7
9. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). The author acknowledges two other cases that address
the legal issues accompanying IVF and cryopreservation. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051
(Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). A.Z. v. B.Z.
involved a situation in which the document signed by the parties in effect gave one party
complete control over the frozen embryos in the event of a contingency. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at
1054. JB. v. M.B. involved a situation in which the document signed by the parties provided
that ownership of the cryopreserved embryos would be relinquished to the IVF program
upon the occurrence of a contingent event. J.B., 751 A.2d at 616. Both of these cases are
distinguishable from Davis because in Davis, no prior agreements existed between the parties
to the dispute. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. Likewise, A.Z. is distinguishable fromKass because
in Kass, the documents signed by the parties provided that the frozen pre-zygotes were to be
donated to the IVF program for biological research and study. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77.
A.Z. andJ.B. specifically addressed the enforceability of contracts to procreate. See A.Z., 725
N.E.2d at 1058; J.B., 751 A.2d at 619. These two cases do not mention nor do they criticize
the reasonable alternatives exception in-any manner so as to bring them within the scope of this
Note.
10. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
11. Id.
12. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), afr'd, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992).
13. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990),
af'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
14. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. Experts at trial testified that the frozen embryos would be
viable for implantation for approximately two years. Id.
15. See id. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that recognition of a veto power was
"not the best route to take, under all the circumstances [of the case]." Id.
16. Id. at 601.
17. Id. at 604. Notice that in its holding the Tennessee Supreme Court uses the term
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This language created what judges and legal scholars alike recognize as the
reasonable alternatives exception.
The next effort made by a state court to address the legal issues surrounding IVF
and cryopreservation was the New York Court of Appeals case, Kass."8 In Kass,
Maureen Kass sought sole "custody" of five frozen pre-zygotes 9 that were produced
as a result of her and her ex-husband's participation in an IVF program ° Maureen
and Steven Kass signed various documents throughout the course of their marriage,
their participation in the IVF program, and their impending divorce that outlined an
agreed method for disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes in the event the couple no
longer wished to use them for implantation.2 The New York Supreme Court, Nassau
County, granted Maureen Kass custody of the pre-zygotes.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, unanimously agreed that any document showing a clear
intent that is created by the parties regarding the disposition of the pre-zygotes in the
event of the occurrence of a contingency should control a custody dispute.2
However, the appellate division was divided on the issue of whether the documents
in question were sufficiently clear so as to provide evidence of the parties' intent as
to the manner of disposition of the frozen embryos.' Although all three of the
appellate division opinions referred to Davis, only Justice Miller, in his dissenting
"preembryo." Id. "Preembryo" is a term for a zygote or a fertilized egg that has not been
implanted in utero. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 952 n.45 (1986). In the
context of IVF and cryopreservation, courts use a variety of terms in addition to "preembryo"
to denote a fertilized egg that has not been implanted in a uterus. The terms "pre-zygote" and
"frozen embryo" are among these additional terms. This Note will use the term of choice for
the particular case being analyzed in the Note text. In the alternative, this Note will use the term
"frozen embryo" to denote this particular stage of development.
18. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
19. See supra note 17.
20. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174.
21. Id. at 176-77. The first set of documents, which were signed by the Kasses prior to their
participation in the IVF program, stated that in the event the parties no longer wished to use
the pre-zygotes for implantation and could not reach an agreement regarding the disposition
of the pre-zygotes, the pre-zygotes would be donated to the program for biological study and
investigative purposes. Id. The second document was an "uncontested divorce" agreement,
which was signed bythe parties shortlybefore their divorce proceedings began, stating that the
parties still desired to have their pre-zygotes donated to the IVF program. Id. at 177.
22. Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995),
rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aft'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
23. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581,590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174
(N.Y. 1998).
24. Compare id. at 583 (plurality opinion) (stating that the intent of the parties-that the
IVF program retain control over the pre-zygotes for research purposes-is clearly expressed
in the provisions of the informed consent document and the uncontested divorce agreement),
with id. at591 (Freidmann, J., concurring) (disagreeing with theplurality's proposition thatthe
terms of the informed consent document are sufficiently unambiguous to manifest an intent
regarding the disposition of the pre-zygotes), and id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) (stating that
the informed consent document failed to reflect an unambiguous statement of intent as to
disposition of the pre-zygotes).
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opinion, mentioned that the Davis court made a"seemingly contradictory statement"'
to the proposition it earlier set forth: "[P]rocreational autonomy is composed of two
rights of equal significance."26 The inconsistent statement to which the dissenting
opinion referred 7 is the reasonable alternatives exception.2"
This Note explores what the dissenting opinion in Kass hinted at but minimally
expounded upon-that is, the reasonable alternatives exception, as it is currently
written, really amounts to no exception at all. Part I of the Note will describe the IVF
and cryopreservation procedures. Part I of the Note will discuss in more detail Davis
and Kass. Part Ill of the Note will provide an analysis of the reasonable alternatives
exception and argue that the reasonable alternatives exception, as it is currently
written, is problematic. Given the unwillingness of the courts to apply the exception
in Davis and Kass, it is apparent that the exception will rarely, if ever, be used. In
addition, the assumptions upon which the reasonable alternatives exception operates
are questionable. Therefore, the reasonable alternatives exception, as it is currently
written, serves no purpose in the resolution of frozen embryo custody disputes. The
Note will conclude that because of the problematic nature of the reasonable
alternatives exception and its lack of any function in the resolution of frozen embryo
custody disputes, the exception must be abandoned or rewritten. Abandoning or, in
the alternative, rewriting the reasonable alternatives exception will purge ourjudicial
system of an exception that deceptively purports to balance the right to procreate with
the right to avoid procreation.
I. rVF AND CRYOPRESERVATION
IVF is a widely used29 and socially accepted" technological alternative to natural
conception. The need for VF cannot be understated in light of the fact that
approximately fifteen percent of all reproductively active couples have difficulty in
naturally conceiving children.' From 1978, the first year in which IVF technology
became available, to 1998,32 more than 35,000 babies in the United States have been
born using the VF process.
33
The IVF process uses hormones to stimulate a woman's ovaries to produce many
25. Id. at 602 (Miller, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992)).
27. Id.
28. See supra text accompanying note 17.
29. Esther M. Schonfeld, Note, "To Be or Not to Be a Parent?" The Search for a Solution
to Custody Disputes over Frozen Embryos, 15 TouRo L. REv. 305, 308 (1998).
30. Carow, supra note 5, at 526 (citing Kathryn V. Lorio, Alternative Means of
Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REv. 1641, 1643-75 (1984)).
3 1. Id. (citing Tamara L. Davis, Comment, Protecting the Cryopreserved Embryo, 57
TENN. L. REv. 507, 510 n.22 (1990)).
32. See Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen
Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 543, 545 (1991) (citing Robertson, supra note 17, at
942-43).
33. Schonfeld, supra note 29, at 309 (citing ARTHUR CAPLAN, DUE CONSIDERATION:
CONTROVERSY IN THE AGE OF MEDICAL MIRACLES (1998)).
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eggs.' Once the eggs mature, they are removed through a surgical procedure called
laparoscopy 5 Upon removal, the mature eggs are placed in a petri dish containing
"'a fluid similar to that found in the fallopian tube,"'36 where.they are combined with
sperm and fertilized.3" The fertilized eggs are allowed to develop in the petri dish
environment for approximately forty-eight to seventy-two hours, wherein they"grow
into a two-, four-, six-, or eight-celled entity."3 At this stage, three or four of the
preembryos are transferred back into the woman's uterus.39 Any surplus preembryos
that are not implanted can be stored through a freezing process known as
cryopreservation. 0 During cryopreservation, the surplus preembryos are "frozen in
nitrogen and stored at sub-zero temperatures."' Hence, this is where the popular term
"frozen embryo" originates. Cryopreservation is beneficial in that implantation can
be postponed until the most optimal time and the couple, particularly the woman, is
somewhat spared from the pain, discomfort, time, and expense that multiple
laparoscopy procedures would entail.42 However, with the benefits of 1VF and
cryopreservation come a whole host of legal disputes concerning frozen embryos
when contingencies arise that the couple had not planned for in advance of their
utilizing these technologies.
If. CASE LAw CONCERNING WE
AND CRYOPRESERVATION
The cases described herein represent the most strenuous attempts by state courts
to date to formulate solutions to the legal dilemmas posed by VF and
cryopreservation technology.43 An understanding of the facts of these cases as well
as the various rulings of the courts involved is imperative to embrace the arguments
posited in Part HI and the Conclusion regarding why the reasonable alternatives
exception must be abandoned or, in the alternative, rewritten.
34. Carow, supra note 5, at 527 (citing Robertson, supra note 17, at 948).
35. Id.
36. Panitch, supra note 32, at 547 (quoting Richard P. Dickey, The Medical Status of the
Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 317, 326 (1986) (citation omitted)).
37. Carow, supra note 5, at 527-28 (citing Kathryn V. Lorio, Alternative Means of
Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1666 (1984)).
38. Id. at 528 (citing Robertson, supra note 17, at 968).
39. John A. Robertson, PriorAgreementsforDisposition ofFrozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407, 407 n.3 (1990). Three or four ofthe preembryos is the maximum number that can be
implanted in utero without compromising the safety of the mother and any potential offspring.
Id.
40. Carow, supra note 5, at 529.
41. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992).
42. Schonfeld, supra note 29, at 310-11 (citing Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen
Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (1986)).
43. See supra note 9.
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A. Davis v. Davis
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis married on April 26, 1980." Soon after their
marriage, Mary Sue suffered a tubal pregnancy that resulted in the removal of her
right fallopian tube.' Mary Sue suffered a total of five tubal pregnancies during the
course of the marriage and eventually decided to have her left fallopian tube ligated.46
Without the proper functioning of either fallopian tube, the couple had no chance to
conceive a child naturally."" The Davises turned to adoption as a means to start their
family, but the birth mother ultimately opted not to put her child up for adoption.
The Davises made other attempts to adopt a child, but those attempts failed because
they proved to be "prohibitively expensive."' 4 Thus, after having exhausted all
nontechnological remedies, the couple turned to a Knoxville fertility clinic and IVF
for help.50
The Davises began participating in the IVF program in 1985.11 The couple
underwent the IVF process a total of six times, at a cost of $35,000, with no success
of pregnancy.5" In 1988, the Davises opted to cryopreserve the surplus preembryos
that were not transferred back into Mary Sue's uterus. 3 Initially, the couple was
elated at the prospects for the cryopreservation process, for at the time, the Davises
were happily married and did not anticipate the occurrence of any unforeseen
contingencies that would necessitate the storage of the frozen embryos beyond a few
months.' However, Mary Sue never became pregnant, and before any of the surplus
preembryos could be transferred, Junior Davis filed for divorce.5
The disposition of the frozen embryos became the ultimate focus of the divorce
proceedings.56 Mary Sue initially requested that the court grant her custody over the
frozen embryos because she desired to use them in a postdivorce attempt to become
a parent.' Junior Davis preferred to leave the preembryos in their frozen state
because he had doubts about becoming a parent outside of marriage. The Circuit
Court of Tennessee awarded custody of the seven frozen embryos to Mary Sue
Davis,59 holding that the frozen embryos were "human life" from the moment of
44. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 592.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 589.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aft'd, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992).
[Vol. 76:507
THE "REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES EXCEPTION"
conception!' and that Mary Sue Davis should "be permitted the opportunity to bring
these children to termthrough implantation."' The trial court's decision was reversed
by the court of appeals based on its finding that Junior Davis had a "constitutionally
protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy [had] taken place."'62 Further,
the court of appeals held that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis "share[d] an interest
in the seven fertilized ova"63 and directed that the parties be vested "withjoint control
... and with equal voice over their disposition.""
By the time the case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court on appeal, the parties'
positions with respect to the frozen embryos had changed.65 Both parties remarried
and Mary Sue no longer wanted to implant the frozen embryos in her own uterus;
rather, she wanted to donate them to other couples that experienced difficulty
naturally conceiving children.' Despite its overall approval of the legal analysis
employed by the court of appeals, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review
because "the decision of the Court of Appeals [did] not give adequate guidance to the
trial court in the event the parties cannot agree."'67 The Tennessee Supreme Court,
therefore, embarked on formulating a new rule in the absence of any statutory
guidance from the state."
The Tennessee Supreme Court first addressed whether preembryos should be
considered"persons" or "property" under the law.' The court referred to Tennessee's
wrongfiul death statute" and other state legislative enactments concerning abortion,"'
assault, 2 and murder73 in order to dismiss the notion that preembryos are "persons"
under state law. 4 The court then referred to the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Roe v. Wade' and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 6 in order to dismiss the
60. Id. at *9.
61. Id. at *11.
62. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990),
aft'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
63. Id. at *3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-208, 68-30-101 to -402 (1996 & 1997),
and York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
64. Id.
65. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 590-91.
69. See id. at 594.
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (Supp. 1999).
71. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-15-201 (1997). This provision adopts the trimester approach
to abortion articulated by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 595 (quoting Davis v. Davis, No. 180,1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990)).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (providing that assault of a viable fetus is a crime, but
having an abortion is not).
73. Id. § 39-13-214 (providing that homicide of a viable fetus is a crime, but having an
abortion is not).
74. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-95 (quoting Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990)).
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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notion that preembryos are recognized as "persons" under federal law."
Though satisfied that the trial court got it wrong, the Tennessee Supreme Court was
not entirely convinced that the court of appeals had got it right and expressed a fear
that the court of appeals "may have swung too far in the opposite direction. ' M The
Tennessee Supreme Court questioned the court of appeals's reliance on legislative
enactments such as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act79 and case law such as York v.
Jones0 by which the court of appeals implied that preembryos are in the nature of a
"property interest."'" Instead, the Tennessee Supreme Court referred to the ethical
standards established by the American Fertility Society' to conclude thatpreembryos
are not "either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for human life."83 Thus, while the
Tennessee Supreme Court did not view Mary Sue's or Junior's interests as "a true
property interest," it did recognize that the two parties had "an interest in the nature
of ownership" to decide the fate of the preembryos. 4
The Tennessee Supreme Court then addressed the issue of contract enforceability
in the context of IVF and cryopreservation procedures. 5 With respect to this issue,
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that "an agreement regarding [the] disposition
of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death of
one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the
program) should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the
77. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
78. Id.
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-101 to -103 (1996). The provisions in the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act determine who controls disposition of organs and tissue that do not have
potential to develop into human life. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
80. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). In York, the court held that a cryopreservation
agreement between a couple and a fertility clinic created a bailment relationship, obligating the
clinic to return one remaining frozen embryo to the couple for later implantation at a different
fertility clinic. Id.
81. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595-96.
82. The ethical standards established by the American Fertility Society posit three views
regarding preembryo status. Id. at 596 (quoting Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations
of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 J. AM. FERTLTY SOC'Y No. 6, June 1990, at 34S-
35S). The first is "that the preembryo [is] a human subject after fertilization, which requires
that it be accorded the rights of a person." Id. As such, this view requires implantation of the
preembryo and forbids any action before implantation that would harm the preembryo. Id. The
second is "that the preembryo has a status no different from any other human tissue." Id. As
such, "[w]ith the consent of those who have decision-making authority over the preembryo, no
limits should be imposed on actions taken with preembryos." Id. The third and most widely
held view is "that the preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue
but not the respect accorded to actual persons." Id. In light of the above views, the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society "conclude[d] that special respect is necessary to
protect the welfare of potential offspring... [and] creates obligations not to hurt or injure the
offspring who might be born after transfer [by research or intervention with a preembryo]." Id.
83. Id. at 597.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 597-98.
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progenitors." '86 However, no agreement was ever contemplated or signed by the
Davises;87 therefore, the court's statements concerning the issue of contract
enforceability were inapplicable to the case."
It was precisely because no agreement existed between the parties in Davis that the
Tennessee Supreme Court found the court of appeals's grant of "joint custody" over
the frozen embryos to be problematic. The absence of any agreement between the
parties and the court of appeals's failure to articulate a solution in the event that the
parties never reached an agreement regarding what to do with the frozen embryos
meant that the party opposing the use of the frozen embryos would have a veto power
because the frozen embryos would continue to be stored and eventually would no
longer be viable for implantation. 9 In an effort to erase any victory by way of such
a veto power,' the Tennessee Supreme Court held that "the right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and
the right to avoid procreation."'" Balancing what the court claimed to recognize as
equal rights,9" it awarded custody of the preembryos to Junior Davis holding:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that
the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than [the] use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable
alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve
pregnancy should be considered.93
Judges and legal scholars came to recognize the above language as the reasonable
alternatives exception. The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, made onlyaminimal
effort to define what reasonable alternatives exist for individuals who, unlike Mary
Sue Davis, desire to use preembryos for themselves, stating:
The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the
preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other
reasonable means. We recognize the trauma that Mary Sue has already
experienced and the additional discomfort to which she would be subjected if she
opts to attempt IVF again. Still, she would have a reasonable opportunity,
through IVF, to try once again to achieve parenthood in all its aspects-genetic,
gestational, bearing, and rearing.
Further, we note that if Mary Sue Davis were unable to undergo another
86. Id. at 597.
87. Id. at 598.
88. See id. The Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly refused to apply the principles of
implied contract or reliance doctrine in favor of Mary Sue Davis on the grounds that the record
did not reflect that the parties ever considered the possibility of contingent events or that Junior
Davis ever contemplated becoming a parent outside of his marriage to her. Id.
89. Id. Experts testified at trial that cryopreserved preembryos would be viable for
implantation for approximately two years. Id.
90. See id. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that the recognition of a veto power was
"not the best route to take, under all the circumstances" to resolve the frozen embryo custody
dispute. Id.
91. Id. at 601.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 604.
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round of IVF, or opted not to try, she could still achieve the child-rearing aspects
of parenthood through adoption. 4
The Tennessee Supreme Court's dialogue, alone, as described in the preceding
paragraphs, demonstrates the reasonable alternatives exception's lack of purpose in
the resolution of frozen embryo custody disputes. The language is indicative of the
fact that all reproductive alternatives count as reasonable alternatives, regardless of
the pain, trauma, and expense suffered by a party prior to a frozen embryo custody
dispute. This invites the obvious question: why have such an exception when the
conditions necessary to invoke it will never exist? The exception's lack of purpose
did not go unnoticed by courts that subsequently addressed custody disputes in the
frozen embryo context.95
B. Kass v. Kass
Maureen and Steven Kass were married on July 4, 1988. After experiencing
difficulty conceiving a child through sexual intercourse, the couple joined an IVF
program sponsored by a Long Island hospital.' Prior to and throughout their
participation in the IVF program, the couple executed informed consent documents.98
These informed consent documents contained provisions stating, among other things,
that the pre-zygotes' would not be released without the written consent of both
participants and that, in the event the couple no longer wished to use the pre-zygotes
to achieve pregnancy or was unable to reach a decision regarding their disposition,
the pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF program for biological research and
investigation."° The Kasses underwent the IVF procedure ten times, at a total cost of
approximately $75,000.' Unfortunately, apregnancy never resulted and the couple
decided to dissolve the marriage, leaving five pre-zygotes in storage under the care
of the IVF program.0 3
Almost immediately after their decision to dissolve the marriage, the parties
executed an uncontested divorce document in which they reiterated their desires to
donate the pre-zygotes for biological research and study.' °4 Less than a month after
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 696
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (Friedmann, J., concurring) ("[Tihere can be few situations, if any,
where the burden upon the party forced to forfeit using particular pre-zygotes to acquire
offspring will outweigh the burden upon the party who wishes to avoid reproduction but is
compelled by court order to become a parent.").
96. Id. at 583.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 17.
100. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583-84.
101. Id. at 583.
102. Maureen Kass's sister acted as the couple's surrogate for the tenth unsuccessful IVF
procedure. Id. at 584. Subsequently, Maureen's sister changed her mind and refused to
participate in any additional IVF attempts. Id. at 583-84.
103. Id. at 584.
104. Id.
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executing the uncontested divorce document, Maureen Kass changed her mind and
filed a matrimonial action in which she sought custody of the pre-zygotes for the
purpose of undergoing an additional IVF attempt."5 Steven Kass opposed giving
Maureen Kass custody of the pre-zygotes and sought to have them donated to the IVF
program, as provided in the informed consent documents signed by both parties.0"
The New York Supreme Court, Nassau County, awarded Maureen Kass possession
of the five pre-zygotes."°7 The court stated that a male's reproductive rights terminate
at the moment of ejaculation because reproductive rights in the IVF context are not
accorded different treatment than reproductive rights in the abortion context!s The
court also stated that the informed consent documents and the uncontested divorce
agreement were not dispositive with respect to the custody dispute."9
Shortly after the trial court's ruling an appeal ensued. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, began its analysis by criticizing the trial court's application
of a woman's right to personal autonomy and the exercise of control over the fate of
her nonviable fetus to the IVF procedure."' The court adopted Davis's conclusion
"that an agreementregarding disposition ofanyuntrasferredpreembryos in the event
of contingencies (such as death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial
reversals, or abandonment of the program) shouldbe presumed valid andbe enforced
as between the progenitors.' Thus, the plurality held that the contracts previously
signed by Maureen and Steven Kass were valid and binding."' A substantial portion
of the plurality opinion was devoted to contractual law issues outside the scope of
Davis and irrelevant to the subject of this Note. However, the reasonable alternatives
exception, the focus of this Note, was discussed in the appellate division's concurring
and dissenting opinions.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Friedmann agreed with the result reachedby the
plurality but disagreed with the route it took to get there. Specifically, the concurring
justices thought that the informed consent documents and the uncontested divorce
agreement were too ambiguous to manifest the true intentions of the parties
involved."' The concurring justices also believed that this case was much closer to
Davis than did the justices comprising the plurality."4 However, the concurring
justices disagreed with the balancing approach articulated by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Davis." Instead, they favored a veto power approach whereby in the event
that the parties disagree over the disposition of frozen embryos and no prior
agreement exists between the parties, the objecting party would be able to
automatically veto a former spouse's proposal for implantation, save in the most
105. Id. at 584-85.
106. Id. at 585.
107. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), rev'd, 663
N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aft'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
108. Id. at *2-3.
109. Id. at *4-5.
110. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86 (plurality opinion).
111. Id. at 587 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 591-92 (Friedman, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 592.
115. Id.
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exceptional of circumstances." 6 The concurring justices favored this approach
because it was clear that there would be few situations, if any, under the balancing
approach, "where the burden upon the party forced to forfeit using particular pre-
zygotes to acquire offspring [would] outweigh the burden upon the party who wishes
to avoid reproduction but is compelled by court order to become a parent.""
7
Reinforcing this idea, the concurring justices held:
[Tihe party seeking to implant the pre-zygotes... should be required to establish
as a threshold matter that she cannot undergo IVF with a new partner or a sperm
donor because, for example, she has lost her ability to ovulate or has some other
major medical contraindication to egg retrieval. Mere discomfort, expense, or
other potentially surmountable difficulties should not suffice to defeat the
defendant's fundamental right to avoid biological fatherhood in a case of this
sort. In addition, adoption should be regarded as among "other reasonable
altematives" to pre-zygote implantation. The wife's mere preference for genetic
parenthood should not override her former spouse's prerogative td elect not to
procreate in circumstances such as these. Only following a prima facie showing
bythe plaintiff that she lacks all other means of achieving genetic parenthood and
that adoption is not a feasible or satisfactory option for her should the hearing
recommended by the dissent be held." 8
Thus, because Maureen Kass could not establish such a threshold, the concurring
justices agreed with the plurality's result-awarding custody of the frozen embryos
to Steven Kass." 9
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Miller agreed with the concurring justices that the
informed consent documents were too ambiguous to manifest the true intentions of
the parties. 2 ° However, Justice Miller disagreed with the concurring opinion's
holding that an objecting party in a frozen embryo dispute should have an automatic
veto power over a party wishing to use the pre-zygotes in a postmarital attempt to
become pregnant.' 2' Justice Miller favored the use of a balancing test and further
judicial proceedings involving a fact-sensitive analysis in order to better supplement
the judicial record with the specifics of the parties' circumstances so that the court
might reach a more equitable solution.' In addition, Justice Miller supported a
resolution that looked to whether alternative, reasonable opportunities existed
whereby the party wishing to implant the frozen embryos could achieve
parenthood." For example, Justice Miller wanted to ask whether there were
additional unfertilized eggs that had already been removed by laparoscopy that could
be fertilized by the sperm of someone other than the ex-husband.'24
Another area of inquiry for Justice Miller concerned the effect that the woman's
"age, physical, emotional, and financial condition" would have on the possibility of
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
119. Seeid. at 593-94.
120. Id. at 594 (Miller, L, dissenting).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 600.
124. Id.
[Vol. 76:507
THE "REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES EXCEPTION"
her undergoing additional IVF procedures with the ex-spouse or a different partner. 25
A final area of inquiry dealt with whether adoption was a reasonable possibility. 26
Justice Miller suggested weighing the aforementioned factors against the burdens
attendant on the party wishing to avoid parenthood.27 Justice Miller stated that these
burdens may include various financial obligations that a parent has to a child, as well
as the potential moral, psychological, and emotional impact that a party could suffer
as a result of unwanted parenthood. ' Thus, instead of automatically granting a veto
to the objecting party when the party wishing to use the pre-zygotes cannot satisfy
evidentiary thresholds and presumptions, the dissent sought to resolve pre-zygote
custody disputes on a case-by-case basis, paying special attention to the
circumstances of each party."
The decision of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, was appealed
by Maureen Kass. Without addressing any of the language in the concurring and
dissenting opinions concerning whether a veto power or balancing test approach
should be used to resolve pre-zygote custody disputes in the event that no agreement
exists between the parties, the New York Court of Appeals focused on the fact that
the parties executed agreements and that those agreements should control the
dispute.'30 Thus, the dissenting and concurring opinions of the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, remain the highest court opinions that analyze the aspect
of the Davis decision pertinent to the subject of this Note, the reasonable alternatives
exception.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES EXCEPTION
The Tennessee Supreme Court created an exception to its holding that
"[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail" when no prior
agreements regarding the disposition of preembryos exist and there is a custody
dispute.' This exception, commonlyknown as the reasonable alternatives exception,
states that "[i]f no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of
using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered."'3 This exception
is problematic. The failure of courts to apply the reasonable alternatives exception to
Mary Sue Davis and Maureen Kass indicates that there are few, if any, circumstances
in which the exception will be applied,' thereby making its existence futile. In
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at600-01.
129. See id. at 601-02.
130. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180-82 (N.Y. 1998).
131. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
132. Id.
133. Justice Friedmann in his concurring opinion in Kass acknowledged as much when he
discussed balancing the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation:
[lI]t is clear to me that there can be few situations, if any, where the burden upon
the party forced to forfeit using particular pre-zygotes to acquire offspring will
outweigh the burden upon the party who wishes to avoid reproduction but is
compelled by court order to become a parent.
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addition, as Justice Miller alluded to in Kass,"3 the exception rests on the
questionable assumption that additional IVF attempts and adoption are "reasonable"
alternatives for all want-to-be parents. 3 In light of the fact that the exception will
rarely, if ever, be applied and that the assumptions upon which the exception is
founded may not be plausible, the reasonable alternatives exception serves absolutely
no purpose in the resolution of frozen embryo custody disputes. The reasonable
alternatives exception, therefore, either needs to be struck from-any judicial opinion
that addresses frozen embryo custody disputes or, in the alternative, the exception
needs to be rewritten in a manner that requires courts to take account of the pain,
trauma, and expense already suffered by the parties prior to the custody dispute.
36
Only by rewriting the exception so that it accounts for past circumstances will courts
ever truly balance the right to procreate with the right to avoid procreation.
A. The Reasonable Alternatives Exception as It Was Applied to
Mary Sue Davis and Maureen Kass
An examination of the reasonable alternatives exception as it was applied to Mary
Sue Davis and Maureen Kass invites the question of whether there are any situations
under which the courts would find that Mary Sue Davis, Maureen Kass, or other
individuals similarly situated had no reasonable alternatives of achieving parenthood
other than through the use of the frozen embryos. Looking at the courts' treatment of
these women suggests a negative response to this question. For instance, Maureen
Kass had been exposed in utero to Diethylstilbistrol ("DES") and, as a result, could
not conceive a child through sexual relations."" Maureen and her spouse underwent
ten unsuccessful IVF attempts at an estimated cost of $75,000.' In addition, after ten
unsuccessful IVF attempts, the surrogate mother forthe tenth IVF attempt, Maureen's
sister, decided that she no longer wished to be part of the IVF program
39
The failure to achieve "balance" by utilizing the reasonable alternatives exception
in frozen embryo custody disputes is better illustrated by Mary Sue Davis's situation.
In the course of her marriage, Mary Sue had both of her fallopian tubes ligated as a
result of suffering five painful, tubal pregnancies. 40 Unable to conceive a child
Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring).
134. Justice Miller wanted to probe the issues of whether adoption was a reasonable
possibility for the party wishing to use the pre-zygotes and whether the party's physical,
emotional, and financial condition would affect future attempts at IVF. Id. at 600 (Miller, J.,
dissenting). His willingness to probe these issues gives rise to the inference that Justice Miller
may not have thought that adoption is always a reasonable alternative and that a party's
physical, emotional, and financial condition could affect future IVF attempts.
135. See generally David L. Theyssen, Note, Balancing Interests in Frozen Embryo
Disputes: Is Adoption Really a Reasonable Alternative?, 74 IND. L.J. 711 (1999).
136. This suggestion is, in effect, a variation on Justice Miller's proposal in Kassthat a court
should consider many diverse factors when balancing the right to procreate and the right to
avoid procreation. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01 (Miller, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 583.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 583-84.
140. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992).
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naturally, she and her husband went through the adoption process only to have the
birth mother change her mind at the last minute.'4' Additional attempts to adopt a
child proved to be "prohibitively expensive."' 42 During each of her six attempts at
IVF, Mary Sue went through a month of injections necessary to shut down the glands
in herbody responsible for menstruation and several days of intermuscular injections
in order to stimulate her ovaries to produce eggs.'43 Also, Mary Sue was anesthetized
a total of five times in order to remove the eggs via the laparoscopy procedure.' In
addition, forty-eight to seventy-two hours after each laparoscopy procedure, she had
to return to the clinic for implantation.'45 Mary Sue and her spouse underwent these
procedures at a cost of $35,000.146 The Tennessee Supreme Court claimed that it
"[was] not unmindful of the... trauma (including both emotional stress and physical
discomfort) to which women are subjected in the lVF process,"'47 yet the court
considered another attempt at IVF with a different partner and adoption to qualify as
reasonable alternatives to achieve parenthood that would preclude Mary Sue Davis
or an individual similarly situated from using the preembryos.'" Another attempt at
IVF and adoption were deemed reasonable alternatives by the concurring justices in
Kass as well."
The Tennessee Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals's lack of
sympathy for the specific medical, physical, emotional, psychological, and financial
conditions that Mary Sue Davis and Maureen Kass experienced suggests that it is
entirely probable that no situation exists in which a court will find that a party does
not have reasonable alternatives available to him or her to achieve parenthood. 5 '
Moreover, in dismissing these women's claims that the use of the frozen embryos in
question was the only possible method to achieve parenthood, the courts never once
mentioned what exactly it would take to satisfy the exception-that is, if Mary Sue's
six attempts at IVF were not enough to preclude IVF as a reasonable alternative in
her case, would more failed attempts have made a difference? Or are these courts
suggesting that if either Mary Sue Davis or Maureen Kass had allocated more than
$35,000 or $75,000, respectively, to the IVF procedure that it would have made a
difference in the outcome? The answer to these inquiries is "no." The reason for this
is that the reasonable alternatives exception amounts to no exception at all regardless
of the circumstances.
One criticism of this analysis is that the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis only
intended to account for reasonable alternatives available to a party in the future when
it articulated the exception. '' Thus, it should not matter how many unsuccessful IVF
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 591-92.
146. Id. at 591.
147. Id. at 601.
148. Id. at 604.
149. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Friedmann, .,
concurring), aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
150. See supra note 133.
151. Such a reading from Davis is legitimized in the following language from the opinion:
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attempts were made in the past or how much money was expended by a party prior
to a custody dispute, for as long as a party has a future possibility of reproducing via
any method deemed reasonable by a court, the party is not entitled to custody of the
frozen embryos. 5 2 The reasonable alternatives exception's exclusive focus on future
reproductive possibilities is precisely what makes it inadequate for balancing
reproductive rights in the frozen embryo context. That is, what a "reasonable
alternative" is cannot be determined without taking into consideration all of the pain,
trauma, and expense suffered by a party prior to a frozen embryo custody dispute.
Factors such as these must be incorporated into the reasonable alternatives exception
in order to achieve a true balance of the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation.1
B. Is Another IVF Attempt or Adoption a Reasonable Alternative?
The reasonable alternatives exception rests on the implausible assumptions that
additional attempts at IVF and adoption are always reasonable alternatives to achieve
parenthood." Is the court just to look at Mary Sue Davis after she has lost both
fallopian tubes as a result of five tubal pregnancies, undergone six unsuccessful
attempts at IVF, and spent $35,000 and tell her that another attempt at IVF is
reasonable? The answer to this question is "no" for several reasons. First, the
reasonable alternatives exception makes it seem as if undergoing the IVF procedure
is just a walk in the park when clearly this is not the case."' Second, the reasonable
alternatives exception assumes that following a contingent event, such as a death or
divorce, a woman is going to be wealthy enough to spend at least another $8,000 to
$10,000 to undergo IVF again. 6 Such an expectation is highly unreasonable if the
contingent event is a divorce in light of the fact that women are, on average,
economicallypoorer than men following divorce. 7 Finally, since most IVF programs
restrict participation to married couples,' the ex-wife will not only have to marry
We recognize the trauma that Mary Sue has already experienced and the
additional discomfort to which she would be subjected if she opts to attempt IVF
again. Still, she would have a reasonable opportunity, through IvF, to try once
again to achieve parenthood in all its aspects-genetic, gestational, bearing, and
rearing.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
152. See id.
153. See supra note 136.
154. See generally Theyssen, supra note 135.
155. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Kass, acknowledged that IVF
is "physically painful, emotionally draining, and financially burdensome." Kass v. Kass, 663
N.Y.S.2d 581,595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Miller, J., dissenting), aft'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998). Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Davis, recognized the trauma and
discomfort that accompanies IVF. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
156. Theyssen, supra note 135, at 725.
157. Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1063, 1063 (1996).
158. Theyssen,supra note 135, at 725 (citing ConsumerProtection IssueslnvolvingIn Vitro
Fertilization Clinics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Bus. Opportunities, and
Energy of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 101st Cong. 71 (1989)).
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again, but the reasonable alternatives exception assumes that she is going to marry
someone who will want to spend the money and time necessary for participation in
an IVF program.
The reasonable alternatives exception also rests on what might be another faulty
assumption-that adoption is areasonable alternative to achieve parenthood. Indeed,
the fact that Mary Sue and Junior Davis had tried to adopt a child makes this
assumption seem plausible. 59 However, in articulating the reasonable alternatives
exception, courts have made it seem as if adoption is a fool-proof way to become a
parent when obviously this is not the case."6 At least one author has opined that
adoption is not a reasonable alternative, because children are not always easily
obtained by adoption and the relationship between an adoptive parent and an adoptive
child is not the same as the relationship between a biological parent and child.'6'
Thus, in light of existing skepticism in the legal field concerning the assumptions
upon which the reasonable alternatives exception relies, the exception's purpose in
resolving frozen embryo disputes becomes all the more questionable.
C. What Is the Solution?
Because the reasonable alternaives exception will rarely, if ever, be applied and
the assumptions upon which the exception relies are not plausible in all cases, it is
difficult to imagine any good reason for continuing to discuss the possibility of
invoking the reasonable alternatives exception when there is a dispute as to which
party gets custody of frozen embryos produced by IVF. The reasonable alternatives
exception amounts to no exception at all, no matter what the circumstances. For this
reason, the reasonable alternatives exception is indeed a "frozen exception" in that
until it is abandoned or, in the alternative, rewritten to require that a court consider
the pain, trauma,.expense, and other circumstances suffered by a party prior to a
frozen embryo custody dispute, the exception will continue to be of absolutely no use
in the resolution of frozen embryo disputes and will only act to refute the courts'
assertions that they are balancing the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation.
Justice Miller's dissenting opinion in Kass62 provides a template for additional
factors that could be incorporated into the reasonable alternatives exception if the
exception is to have anypurpose in the resolution of frozen embryo custody disputes.
For instance, the exception could be written to state that after a certain number of
unsuccessful attempts at IVF, it is no longer a reasonable alternative to achieve
parenthood. To couch the exception in this way would demonstrate that the courts do
recognize the trauma and discomfort involved in the IVF procedure." More
159. The Davis court relied on the fact that Mary Sue and Junior Davis pursued adoption
to conclude that adoption would be a reasonable alternative for Mary Sue to achieve
parenthood. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
160. For example, Mary Sue and Junior Davis were "victimized" by the adoption process
when a birth mother withdrew from the adoption arrangement. Id. at 591.
161. Theyssen, supra note 135, at 725.
162. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Miller, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
163. Contra Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. The Tennessee Supreme Court devotes only two
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specifically, the exception could state that courts are going to look ataperson's "age,
physical, emotional, and financial condition"'" in making the determination as to
whether an additional attempt at IVF is a reasonable means of achieving parenthood.
In addition, the exception could state that previous, unsuccessful attempts to adopt
a child will weigh into the decision of whether adoption is a reasonable alternative
to achieving parenthood.6 Such an incorporation into the reasonable alternatives
exception would demonstrate that the courts are aware that adoption is not always a
fool-proof way to become a parent. Finally, the exception could include some
statement that the courts will scrutinize the opposing party's reasons for objecting to
the use of the frozen embryos." At least in the case of divorce, the objection to the
use of the frozen embryos may be predicated on malice or some other frivolous
reason. 67 The inclusion of such a factor would make the exception less favorable to
the right to avoid procreation. It is not enough if these factors are unspoken yet taken
into consideration when the courts attempt to resolve frozen embryo disputes. In
order to make this an "exception with teeth," these factors need to be articulated so
that individuals can understand the sincerity with which the courts approach the
balancing of the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.
CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Kaye in the New York Court of'Appeals's decision in Kass stated: "As
science races ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions.
The law, whether statutory or decisional, has been evolving more slowly and
cautiously."'68 The truth in this statement cannot be understated in light of the legal
developments concerning IVF and cryopreservation. The continued inclusion of the
reasonable alternatives exception in judicial opinions addressing frozen embryo
disputes is arguably one of the causes for the slow development of the law in this
area. This is due to the fact that the reasonable alternatives exception as it is currently
written will rarely, if ever, be applied, and that the assumptions on which the
exception is built may not always be plausible; therefore, the exception serves
absolutely no purpose in the resolution of frozen embryo custody disputes. If the law
is expected to keep in pace with the progress of science, particularly in the area of
IVF and cryopreservation, the reasonable alternatives exception must be abandoned
or rewritten so that the exception, which is arguably a "frozen exception," can be
transformed into a test that truly balances the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation.
sentences to the trauma and suffering that additional attempts at IVF would entail. See id.
164. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Miller, J., dissenting).
165. Cf. id.
166. See id. This is a factor that was directly articulated by Justice Miller in Kass. See id.
167. See id. at 600-01.
168. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).
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